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In this paper, Information Logic of Galois Connections (ILGC) suited for approximate rea-
soning about knowledge is introduced. In addition to the three classical propositional logic
axioms and the inference rule of modus ponens, ILGC contains only two auxiliary rules of
inference mimicking the performance of Galois connections of lattice theory, and this
makes ILGC comfortable to use due to the ﬂip-ﬂop property of the modal connectives.
Kripke-style semantics based on information relations is deﬁned for ILGC. It is also shown
that ILGC is equivalent to the minimal tense logic Kt , and decidability and completeness of
ILGC follow from this observation. Additionally, relationship of ILGC to the so-called clas-
sical modal logics is studied. Namely, a certain composition of Galois connection mappings
forms a lattice-theoretical interior operator, and this motivates us to axiomatize a logic of
these compositions. It turns out that this logic satisﬁes the axioms of the non-normal logic
EMT4. Hence, EMT4 can be viewed to be embedded in ILGC. EMT4 is complete with respect
to the neighbourhood semantics. Here, we introduce an alternative semantics for EMT4.
This is done by deﬁning the so-called interior models, and completeness of EMT4 is proved
with respect to the interior semantics.
 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The theory of rough sets introduced by Pawlak [36] can be viewed as an extension of the classical set theory. Its funda-
mental idea is that our knowledge about objects of a given universe of discourse U may be inadequate or incomplete. The
objects can then be observed only with the accuracy restricted by some indiscernibility relation. According to Pawlak’s ori-
ginal deﬁnition, an indiscernibility relation E on U is an equivalence interpreted so that two elements of U are E-related if
they cannot be distinguished by their properties. Since there is one-to-one correspondence between equivalences and par-
titions, each indiscernibility relation induces a partition on U. In this sense, our ability to distinguish objects can be under-
stood to be blurred – we cannot distinguish individual objects, only their equivalence classes.
Each subset X of U can be approximated by two sets: the lower approximation X. of X consists of E-equivalence classes
that are included in X, and X’s upper approximation XN contains E-classes intersecting with X. The lower approximation X.
can be viewed as a set of elements that are certainly in X and the upper approximation XN can be considered as a set of ele-
ments that possibly belong to X. Note also that approximations may be considered to be deﬁnable or exact in the sense that
they are unions of classes of indistinguishable elements. This may be interpreted so that deﬁnable sets are describable as the
disjunction of the properties of the objects they contain.
The literature, however, contains studies in which rough approximations are deﬁned by relations that are not necessarily
equivalences (see e.g. [16] for further details). In [15,19], we studied approximations in a more general setting of complete. All rights reserved.
n), Kondo@sie.dendai.ac.jp (M. Kondo), Jari.Kortelainen@mamk.ﬁ (J. Kortelainen).
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[21,24].
To be as general as possible, in this paper R is allowed to be any arbitrary binary relation. We may also deﬁne for each
subset X of the universe U the rough set approximations by the means of the inverse R1 of R and these sets are denoted
by XO and X4. Therefore, for every Xwe may attach two lower approximations, X. and XO, and two upper approximations,
XN and X4. Note also that the studies appearing in the literature usually consider the pair of rough approximation mappings
N and . that are mutually dual. However, in this work we focus on the pair ðN;OÞ forming a Galois connection. Obviously,
even in this more general case, the set XO can be considered as the set of elements that necessarily are in X, because if an
element y is R-related to some element x 2 XO, then y must be in X. Similarly, XN may be viewed as the set of elements
possibly belonging to X, since if x 2 XN, then there exists an element y in X to which x is R-related.
In this work we also brieﬂy consider Pawlak’s information systems [35]. They consist of a set U of objects and a set of
attributes A. Every attribute a 2 A attaches the value aðxÞ of the attribute a to the object x. The key idea in Pawlak’s informa-
tion systems is that each subset B#A of attributes determines an indiscernibility relation indðBÞwhich is deﬁned so that two
objects x and y of the universe U are B-indiscernible if their values for all attributes in the set B are equal, that is, aðxÞ ¼ aðyÞ
for all a 2 B. Orłowska and Pawlak introduced in [34] many-valued information systems as a generalization of Pawlak’s
original systems. In a many-valued information system each attribute attaches a set of values to objects. Therefore, in
many-valued systems it is possible to deﬁne several types of information relations reﬂecting distinguishability or indistin-
guishability of objects of the system.
L-sets introducedbyGoguen [13]determine relations reﬂectingknowledgeaboutobjects. The ideapresentedbyKortelainen
[25,26] is that each L-setuonU induces a binary relation K such that xK yholds,whenever ybelongs to the set representedby
u at least to the same extent as x. Now the relation K, or its inverse J as well, can be used to determine the approximation
mappings. The essential connections between modal-like operators, topologies and fuzzy sets are studied in [22].
In the literature there are several studies on logical foundations of rough sets. Usually these logics have a semantics sim-
ilar to the one by Kripke [27]. In the paper [37], Pawlak formulated some notions of rough logics. Rasiowa and Skowron [39]
have introduced ﬁrst-order predicate logic suited for rough approximations and deﬁnability. Orłowska with her coauthors
has extensively studied several logics for knowledge representation – see [12,33,34], for example. Vakarelov [41,42] has
investigated modal logics for information relations of many-valued information systems. Many of these mentioned logics
are examined for instance in survey papers [3,44]. Orłowska has also introduced Kripke models with relative accessibility
relations in [32] – these are modiﬁcations of the ordinary Kripke structure such that ‘accessibility relations’ are determined
by sets of parameters interpreted as a properties of objects. In addition to this, Demri and Goré [7] have deﬁned cut-free dis-
play calculi for knowledge representation logics with relative accessibility relations, and in [9] Demri and Stepaniuk fully
characterized the computational complexity of approximation multimodal logics.
It also should be mentioned that Mattila has considered the so-called modiﬁer logics closely related to fuzzy logic in
several works; see e.g. [29], for further details and references. For example, in [30] a modiﬁer calculi together with relational
frame semantics and some ideas for topological semantics is given. Finally, note that von Karger has developed in [43]
several temporal logics from the theory of complete lattices, Galois connections, and ﬁxed points.
This paper is presented as follows: In Section 2, we deﬁne Galois connections and recall some of their well-known prop-
erties. We also introduce generalized rough approximation operations based on information relations. We show how they
induce Galois connections and give two examples of approximation operators determined by information relations of
information systems and L-sets. Furthermore, the so-called rough fuzzy sets are brieﬂy considered. Section 3 introduces
Information Logic of Galois Connections (ILGC), which is just the standard propositional logic with two modal connectives
O andN. ConcerningO andN, we have only two additional rules of inference mimicking the behavior of Galois connection
maps. In Section 4, we show that in fact the introduced logic ILGC is equivalent to the well-known minimal tense logic Kt
with respect to provability of formulae. This is interesting since ILGC has only two additional deduction rules and no further
axioms, as Kt has four additional axioms and two auxiliary rules of inference. Therefore, ILGC can be viewed as a very simple
formulation of Kt . The equivalence of ILGC and Kt implies easily that ILGC is decidable, since Kt is known to be decidable. In
addition, completeness of ILGC follows from a similar argument, because semantics deﬁned for these logics may be easily
identiﬁed. Finally, in Section 5 we study the relationship between ILGC and the non-normal modal logic EMT4. Namely, a
certain composition of Galois connection mappings forms a lattice-theoretical interior operator, and we are formalizing a
logic for such compositions. The presented logic is not normal in the sense that it does not satisfy (RN) nor (K). So, it is clear
that we cannot deﬁne Kripke-style of semantics for our new connective  by the means of a frame F ¼ ðU;RÞ of just one
binary relation in a standard way. We show that the introduced logic of compositions satisﬁes the axioms of EMT4, and
hence EMT4 can be extracted from ILGC. We also introduce the interior semantics for EMT4 and prove completeness of
EMT4 with respect to this semantics. Finally, some concluding remarks are given.2. Galois connections of information relations
We begin our study by recalling Galois connections and their basic properties; these can be found in [11], for example. For
two ordered sets P and Q, a pair ðI;/Þ of mapsI: P ! Q and /: Q ! P is called a Galois connection between P and Q if for all
p 2 P and q 2 Q ,
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The functionI is called a residuated map and the function / is called a residual map. The next proposition gives some well-
known properties of Galois connections.
Proposition 1. Assume ðI;/Þ is a Galois connection between ordered sets P and Q. Let p; p1; p2 2 P and q; q1; q2 2 Q. Then the
following assertions hold:
(i) p1 6 p2 ) pI1 6 pI2 and q1 6 q2 ) q/1 6 q/2 .
(ii) p 6 pI/ and q/I 6 q.
(iii) pI ¼ pI/I and q/ ¼ q/I/.
(iv) I preserves all existing joins and / preserves all existing meets.
(v) The composite I/: P ! P is a lattice-theoretical closure operator and the composite /I: Q ! Q is a lattice-theoretical
interior operator.
It is known that ðI;/Þ is a Galois connection between two ordered sets if and only ifI and / satisfy (i) and (ii). Notice
also that Galois connections were originally deﬁned with functions that reverse order. We use the above form since it is more
suitable for our purposes.
Proposition 1 implies that if P and Q are bounded lattices, thenI is a _-homomorphism and / is a ^-homomorphism,
that is, ða _ bÞI ¼ aI _ bI and ðx ^ yÞ/ ¼ x/ ^ y/ for all a; b 2 P and x; y 2 Q . Additionally, I is ?-preserving and / is
>-preserving, that is, ?I ¼? and >/ ¼ >.
Next we consider generalized rough set approximations – see e.g. [23] for further details. Let U be a set, called the universe
of discourse and let R be a binary relation on U. The upper approximation of a set X#U isXN ¼ fx 2 U j ð9y 2 UÞ x R y& y 2 Xg
and the lower approximation of X isX. ¼ fx 2 U j ð8y 2 UÞ x R y) y 2 Xg:
Obviously, the maps are dual, that is, for any X#U,XcN ¼ X.c and Xc. ¼ XNc;
where Xc ¼ fx 2 U j x R Xg is the complement of X in the universe U.
Wemay also deﬁne an analogous pair of mappings }ðUÞ ! }ðUÞ by reversing the relation R. For any set X#U, let us deﬁne
X4 ¼ fx 2 U j ð9y 2 UÞ y R x& y 2 XgandXO ¼ fx 2 U j ð8y 2 UÞ yR x) y 2 Xg:
Trivially, 4 and O also are dual. The next result is well known.
Proposition 2. For any binary relation, the pairs ðN;OÞ and ð4;.Þ are Galois connections.
We end this section by considering two more concrete examples of approximation operations.
Information relations. Many-valued information systems were introduced in [34], and different types of information relations
considered here can be found in [8], for instance. Amany-valued information system is a pair ðU;AÞ, where U is a set of objects
and A is a set of attributes such that each attribute is a map a: U ! }ðVaÞ, where Va is the value set of the attribute a. This
means that attributes attach sets of values to objects. For example, if a is the attribute ‘knowledge of languages’ and a person
denoted by x knows English and Finnish, then aðxÞ ¼ fEnglish; Finnishg.
Objects of an information system may be related in different ways with respect to their values of attributes. We recall
some information relations reﬂecting indistinguishability of objects of an information system ðU;AÞ. For any B#A, the
following relations may be deﬁned:ðx; yÞ 2 indðBÞ () ð8a 2 BÞ aðxÞ ¼ aðyÞ
ðx; yÞ 2 simðBÞ () ð8a 2 BÞ aðxÞ \ aðyÞ–;
ðx; yÞ 2 incðBÞ () ð8a 2 BÞ aðxÞ# aðyÞThese relations are referred to as B-indiscernibility, B-similarity and B-inclusion, respectively.
If a is again the attribute ‘knowledge of languages’ and R is the a-similarity relation, then two objects x and y are R-related
if they have a common lanzguage. The similarity relation is obviously symmetric, which gives that XN ¼ X4 and X. ¼ XO.
Obviously, x 2 XN if there exists a person y 2 X who has a common language with x. Similarly, x 2 XO if all persons having a
common language with x are in X.
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sets were generalized to L-fuzzy sets by Goguen [13] in such a way that an L-fuzzy set u on U is a mapping u: U ! L, where L
is equipped with some ordering structure. However, in this paper, we use the term ‘L-set’ instead of ‘L-fuzzy set’.
Notice that in the literature L is usually assumed to be at least a complete lattice. The motivation for this is that in such a
setting it is possible to consider many-valued logics in which some truth values are incomparable. The least element ? and
the greatest element> of Lmay be viewed as the ‘absolute’ truth values false and true. In this work, L is always assumed to be
a preordered set, that is, the set L is equipped with a reﬂexive and transitive binary relation 6. Typically, L may consist of
linguistic membership values such as ‘good’, ‘excellent’, ‘poor’ and ‘adequate’, and the preorder relation w1 6 w2 holds be-
tween two values w1 and w2, if w2 is ‘stronger’ than w1. For instance, ‘poor’ 6 ‘excellent’. It is natural to assume that the rela-
tion 6 is not antisymmetric: if w1;w2 2 L are synonyms, that is, distinct words or expressions w1 and w2 that are used with
same meaning, then it is the case that w1 6 w2 and w1 P w2. Hence, w1 and w2 are in a sense equivalent, but not the same
words. This kind of more general setting enables us to move towards the methodology called computing with words [46], in
which the objects of computation are given by a natural language. Computing with words, in general, is inspired by the hu-
man capability to perform a wide variety of tasks without any measurements and any quantizations. Note also that in [17]
the operations of union, intersection, and complement for preorder-based fuzzy sets were considered.
As noted in [25], each L-set u: U ! L determines a preorder K on U by
xK y () uðxÞ 6 uðyÞ:Assume now that u: U ! L is an L-set describing the ability of persons in U to speak Japanese. Furthermore, we denote the
inverse relation of K by J . Then, xJ y is true if x can speak Japanese at least as well as y.
Let us consider the approximations deﬁned by the relation J , that is,XN ¼ fx 2 U j ð9y 2 UÞ xJ y& y 2 Xg
andXO ¼ fx 2 U j ð8y 2 UÞ yJ x) y 2 Xg:
Now, x 2 XN if and only if x can speak Japanese at least as well as some person in X. Furthermore, x 2 XO if and only if yJ x
implies y 2 X, that is, there cannot be a person outside X speaking Japanese at least as well as x. Thus, approximations have a
nice interpretation also in case of fuzzy sets.
Notice that the other pair of approximation maps ð4;.Þ also forming a Galois connection is deﬁned by x 2 X4 if and only
if there exists y 2 U such that xK y and y 2 X, and x 2 X. whenever for all y 2 U, yK x implies y 2 X.
Rough fuzzy sets. Let us denote by I the unit interval ½0;1. For any non-empty setU, we denote by IU the set of all fuzzy sets onU.
Because the interval I may be ordered with its usual order, also the set IU can be ordered pointwise by settingu 6 w () ð8x 2 UÞuðxÞ 6 wðxÞ
for all u;w 2 IU . It is easy to observe that with respect to the pointwise order, IU is a distributive lattice such that for all
u;w 2 IU and x 2 U,ðu _ wÞðxÞ ¼ maxfuðxÞ;wðxÞg
andðu ^ wÞðxÞ ¼ minfuðxÞ;wðxÞg:
The so-called Gödel implication (see e.g. [14]) is deﬁned in I byx! y ¼ 1; if x 6 y;
y; otherwise:We can now deﬁne implication in IU pointwise:
ðu! wÞðxÞ ¼ uðxÞ ! wðxÞ:It is clear that in the lattice IU the fuzzy set u! w is the relative pseudocomplement of u with respect to w in the sense of
[38], that is, if for all l 2 IU ,u ^ l 6 w () l 6 u! w:
Furthermore, a fuzzy relation on U is a mapping U  U ! ½0;1.
Dubois and Prade [10] introduced in 1990 rough fuzzy sets. The idea is that the objects to be operated are fuzzy instead of
classical sets. As a result we obtain certain kind of ‘coarsened fuzzy sets’. Letu 2 IU be a fuzzy set and let R be a fuzzy relation
on U. Then we may deﬁne the fuzzy sets uN and uO on U by settinguNðxÞ ¼
_
y2U
fRðx; yÞ ^uðyÞg
uOðxÞ ¼
^
y2U
fRðy; xÞ ! uðyÞgfor all x 2 U. It is easy to see that the pair ðN;OÞ is a Galois connection on IU .
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duced a many-valued logic for modiﬁers of fuzzy sets together with its axiomatization and semantics. Furthermore, we
proved completeness of the logic there.
3. Syntax and semantics of ILGC
In this section, we introduce a simple propositional logic ILGC – an acronym for Information Logic of Galois Connections –
with two additional connectives N and O.
Let P be an enumerable set, whose elements are called propositional variables. The set of connectives consists of logical
symbols !, :, N, and O. A formula of ILGC is deﬁned inductively as follows:
(i) Every propositional variable is a formula.
(ii) If A and B are formulae of ILGC, then so are A! B, :A, NA, and OA.
Let us denote by U the set of all formulae of ILGC.
The logical system ILGC has the following three axioms of classical propositional logic:
(Ax1) A! ðB! AÞ
(Ax2) ðA! ðB! CÞÞ ! ððA! BÞ ! ðA! CÞÞ
(Ax3) ð:A! :BÞ ! ðB! AÞ
Furthermore, ILGC has the following three rules of inference:ðMPÞ A A! B
B
ðGC1Þ A!OBNA! B ðGC2Þ
NA! B
A!OBThe ﬁrst rule is the classical modus ponens, and (GC1) and (GC2) mimic the conditions appearing in the deﬁnition of Galois
connections.
An ILGC-formula A is said to be provable, if there is a ﬁnite sequence A1;A2; . . . ;An of ILGC-formulae such that A ¼ An and
for every 1 6 i 6 n:
(i) Either Ai is an axiom of ILGC,
(ii) or Ai is the conclusion of some inference rules, whose premises are in the set fA1; . . . ;Ai1g.
That A is provable in ILGC is denoted by ‘ A.
We can show that ‘ B! ðA! AÞ for all formulae A;B 2 U. Therefore, we have that A! A and B! B are equivalent to each
other. We may use this ‘equivalence class’ as the constant true. Formally, let p be some ﬁxed propositional variable. Then, we
set> :¼ p! p:
The constant false is deﬁned by? :¼ :>:It is clear that ‘ A! > and ‘?! A for all A 2 U. Additionally, the following abbreviations for disjunction, conjunction, and
equivalence are introduced:A _ B :¼ ðA! BÞ ! B
A ^ B :¼ :ð:A _ :BÞ
A$ B :¼ ðA! BÞ ^ ðB! AÞOur next proposition presents some provable formulae and additional inference rules of ILGC.
Proposition 3. For all ILGC-formulae A and B, we have:
(i)
A! B
OA! OB and
A! B
NA!NB
(ii) ‘ A!ONA and ‘NOA! A
(iii) ‘OA$ONOA and ‘NA$NONA
(iv) ‘O> $ > and ‘N ?$?
(v)
A
OA
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(vii) ‘ OðA! BÞ ! ðOA! OBÞProof. Note that we prove only the ﬁrst claims of (i)–(iv) and (vi), because their second parts can be proved in an analogous
manner.
(i) Suppose that ‘ A! B. Because ‘OA!OA holds trivially, we obtain ‘NOA! A by (GC1). Hence ‘NOA! B, which
gives ‘OA!OB by (GC2).
(ii) Because ‘NA!NA, we have ‘ A!ONA by (GC2).
(iii) Obviously, by (ii), ‘OA!ONOA. Furthermore, since ‘NOA! A, we get ‘ONOA!OA by (i).
(iv) It is clear that ‘O> ! >. Conversely, ‘N> ! > implies ‘ > !O> by (GC2).
(v) Assume ‘ A. This means ‘ > ! A and we get ‘O> !OA by (i). Because ‘ > !O> by (iv), we obtain ‘ > !OA.
Thus, ‘OA.
(vi) Because ‘ A ^ B! A and ‘ A ^ B! B, we have ‘OðA ^ BÞ !OA and ‘OðA ^ BÞ !OB by (i). Hence, ‘OðA ^ BÞ !
OA ^OB. On the other hand, ‘OA ^OB!OA yields ‘NðOA ^OBÞ ! A by (GC2). Similarly, we may show
‘NðOA ^OBÞ ! B. This gives that ‘NðOA ^OBÞ ! A ^ B and ‘OA ^OB!OðA ^ BÞ by (GC2).
(vii) Since ‘ A ^ ðA! BÞ ! B, we have ‘OðA ^ ðA! BÞÞ !OB. Furthermore, by (vi), we obtain ‘OA ^OðA! BÞ !
OðA ^ ðA! BÞÞ. Thus, ‘OA ^OðA! BÞ !OB, which is equivalent to ‘OðA! BÞ ! ðOA!OBÞ. hWemay also introduce another pair4 and. of connectives. This is done by deﬁning them as the duals ofO andN. Let us
set4A :¼ :O:A and .A :¼ :N:A:
For the connectives 4 and ., we have similar inference rules that we have for the original connectives N and O.
Lemma 4. For all ILGC-formulae A and B, we haveA! .B
4A! B and
4A! B
A! .B :Proof. We prove the ﬁrst rule – the second can be proved in an analogous manner. Assume that ‘ A!.B. By (Ax3),
‘ ðA!.BÞ ! ð:.B! :AÞ. Therefore, ‘ :.B! :A by (MP) and hence ‘N:B! :A. By applying (GC2), we obtain
‘ :B! 1O:A and ‘ :B! :4 A. This implies ‘ 4A! B by (Ax3) and (MP). h
Note that Lemma 4 means that the connectives . and 4 have all the properties listed in Proposition 3 for O and N.
We introduce the semantics of the language ILGC. A relational structureF ¼ ðU;RÞ, where U is a non-empty set and R is a
binary relation on U, is called an ILGC-frame. Let v be a function v: P ! }ðUÞ assigning to each propositional variable p in P a
subset vðpÞ of U. Such functions are called valuations and the tripleM ¼ ðU;R; vÞ is called an ILGC-model.
For any x 2 U and A 2 U, we deﬁne a satisﬁability relationM; x  A according the usual Kripke semantics of the formula A
inductively by the following way:
M; x  p iff x 2 vðpÞ
M; x  :A iff M; x 2 A
M; x  A! B iff M; x  A impliesM; x  B
M; x NA iff there exists y 2 U such that x R y and M; y  A
M; x OA iff for all y 2 U; y R x implies M; y  A
We may extend the valuation function v to all U-formulae by settingvðAÞ ¼ fx 2 U jM; x  Ag:
It is then easy to see that for all A;B 2 U:
(i) vð?Þ ¼ ; and vð>Þ ¼ U
(ii) vðA _ BÞ ¼ vðAÞ [ vðBÞ and vðA ^ BÞ ¼ vðAÞ \ vðBÞ
(iii) vð:AÞ ¼ vðAÞc and vðA! BÞ ¼ vðAÞc [ vðBÞ
(iv) vðNAÞ ¼ vðAÞN and vðOAÞ ¼ vðAÞO
(v) vð4AÞ ¼ vðAÞ4 and vð.AÞ ¼ vðAÞ.
An ILGC-formula A is said to be true in an ILGC-modelM ¼ ðU;R; vÞ, writtenM  A, if for all x 2 U,M; x  A. The formula A
is valid in an ILGC-frame F ¼ ðU;RÞ, if A is true in all ILGC-modelsM ¼ ðU;R; vÞ based on F. Furthermore, A is valid, if A is
valid in all ILGC-frames.
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worlds in such a way that a valuation gives a truth value to each propositional variable for each of the possible worlds. Hence,
the value assigned to a propositional variable p for world w may differ from the value assigned to p for another world w’.
Similarly, in temporal logics, the same sentence may have different truth values in different times. The logic ILGC can be
interpreted as an information logic in which formulae are viewed to represent properties that objects of a given restricted
universe of discourse may have.
For example, let U be some set of human beings and let R be a relation reﬂecting similarity of people with respect to some
suitable attributes – what those properties might be is irrelevant for this consideration. Then, the pairF ¼ ðU;RÞ is clearly an
ILGC-frame. LetM ¼ ðU;R; vÞ be a model based on the frameF and let A be an ILGC-formula such that vðAÞ consists of ‘good
teachers’. Then,M; x  A can be interpreted as a sentence ‘x is a good teacher’, andM; x NA holds if there exists y 2 U such
that x R y and M; y  A, that is, there is a good teacher y to whom x is similar. Analogously, M; x OA means that y R x
impliesM; y  A, that is, all people similar to x are good teachers.
In case of fuzzy sets, we may consider a situation in which an L-set u: U ! L represents how an expert evaluates the
suitability of the persons in U to act as a teacher by using some expressions and attributes L of his own language. Let us now
consider the relation J on U. Then xJ ymeans simply that the expert has the opinion that x is at least as good a teacher as y.
Let B now be an ILGC-formula such that people in vðBÞ are currently acting as teachers. Then,M; x NB holds if there exists
y 2 U such that xJ y andM; y  B, that is, x is at least as good as one acting teacher, andM; x OB if yJ x impliesM; y  B,
which may be interpreted so that all persons who have at least as good teaching abilities as x are all acting as teachers.
Note also that being a valid formula has the interpretation that all objects in the universe of discourse U have the property
the formula represents.
4. ILGC is Kt
In this section we study how our logic relates to the well-knownminimal tense logic Kt . As before, let P be an enumerable
set of propositional variables. Now the set of connectives consists of logical symbols!, :, G and H. Kt-formulae are deﬁned
inductively as ILGC-formulae, and the set of all Kt-formulae is denoted by W. In distinction, recall that the set of ILGC-for-
mulae is denoted by U.
A formula GA is interpreted as ‘it will always be the case that A’ and HA has the meaning ‘it has always been the case that
A’. Furthermore, their dual connectives P and F are deﬁned byFA :¼ :G:A and PA :¼ :H:A:
The logic Kt has the following seven axioms:
(Ax1) A! ðB! AÞ
(Ax2) ðA! ðB! CÞÞ ! ððA! BÞ ! ðA! CÞÞ
(Ax3) ð:A! :BÞ ! ðB! AÞ
(Ax4) A! HFA
(Ax5) A! GPA
(Ax6) HðA! BÞ ! ðHA! HBÞ
(Ax7) GðA! BÞ ! ðGA! GBÞ
Furthermore, Kt has three rules of inference:ðMPÞ A A! B
B
ðRHÞ A
HA
ðRGÞ A
GAThat a Kt-formula A is provable is deﬁned as in case of ILGC.
Our purpose is to show that ILGC and Kt are equivalent with respect to provability. Indeed, ILGC appears much simpler
than Kt , since ILGC has only three axioms (Ax1)–(Ax3) and three rules of inference. Therefore, ILGC can also viewed as a very
simple formulation of Kt .
At the ﬁrst glance the language of our logic ILGC is different from the one of Kt . However, if we replace for an ILGC-formula
A 2 U every symbolN by F and every O by H, we will obtain a Kt-formula Aw 2 W. Similarly, any Kt-formula B 2 W can be
transformed to an ILGC-formula B/ by replacing the occurrences of F, G, P, and H byN,.,4, andO, respectively. Therefore,
the languages of these may be considered to be exactly the same.
It is straightforward to prove the next lemma stating that each provable ILGC-formula A can be translated to a provable
Kt-formula A
w.
Lemma 6. If an ILGC-formula A 2 U is ILGC-provable, then the corresponding Kt-formula Aw 2 W is Kt-provable.
Proof. Assume A 2 U is a provable ILGC-formula. We prove the claim by induction. If A is an ILGC-axiom, then the assertion
holds trivially because the axioms of ILGC are included in the axioms of Kt .
If A is deduced from B and B! A by (MP), then, by the induction hypothesis Bw and ðB! AÞw are provable Kt-formulae.
Since ðB! AÞw is Bw ! Aw, Aw is a provable Kt-formula by (MP).
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provable Kt-formula by the induction hypothesis, we have that HFBw ! HCw is Kt-provable by (RH). Additionally, Bw ! HFBw
is Kt-provable by (Ax4). Thus, we obtain that Bw ! HCw is a provable Kt-formula. This gives that Bw ! ðOCÞw and ðB! OCÞw
are Kt-provable.
The case involving (GC1) can be proved in an analogous way. h
Our next lemma states that also the converse statement holds.
Lemma 7. If a Kt-formula A 2 W is Kt-provable, then the ILGC-formula A/ 2 U is ILGC-provable.
Proof. The proof is clear by Proposition 3 and Lemma 4. h
Lemmas 6 and 7 imply that ILGC and Kt are equivalent with respect to provability. It is well-known that Kt is decidable,
that is, there exists an algorithm which for every Kt-formula is capable of deciding in ﬁnitely many steps whether the for-
mula is provable in the system or not. Therefore, we may give the following theorem.
Theorem 8 (Decidability theorem). ILGC is decidable.
Next we recall the standard model-theoretic semantics of tense logic Kt . A temporal frame ðT; <Þ consists of a set T of enti-
ties called times together with a binary relation < on T. This deﬁnes the ‘ﬂow of time’ over which the meanings of the tense
operators are to be deﬁned. An interpretation of the tense-logical language gives a truth value to each atomic formula at each
time t 2 T in the temporal frame. The meanings of G and H can be deﬁned by:
HA is true at t iff A is true at all times t0 such that t0 < t
GA is true at t iff A is true at all times t0 such that t < t0
It is now clear that if we identify< and R as well as T and U, then HA is true exactly whenOA is true, and GA is true in case
.A is. As a corollary of this observation, we get completeness of ILGC.
Theorem 9 (Completeness theorem). An ILGC-formula is valid if and only if it is provable.5. EMT4 from ILGC
Here, we study the relationship between ILGC and the well-known non-normal modal logic EMT4. Most of the so-called
‘normal modal logics’ include the necessitation rule:ðRNÞ AA :Furthermore, the distribution axiomðKÞ ðA! BÞ ! A! B
is usually included. The weakest normal modal logic, named K in honor of Saul Kripke, is simply the propositional calculus
added with an extra connective , the rule (RN), and the axiom (K). Let us recall also the axioms (T) and (4):ðTÞ A! A
ð4Þ A! AThe logic S4 is characterized by axioms (T), (4) and (K) together with the rule (RN).
If we now come back to ILGC, we may deﬁne an additional connective  by setting for any ILGC-formula A 2 U,
A :¼NOA:By Proposition 3, ‘ A! A and ‘ A! A, that is, the (T) and (4) are provable in ILGC. Similarly, we may show thatðRMÞ A! BA! B
is a rule of inference. We can also deﬁne the modal connective of possibility  in a standard way as the dual of  by setting
for all A 2 U,A :¼ ::A:Interestingly, this means that A ¼ :NO:A ¼.4A. Unfortunately, our logic is not normal in the sense that it does not sat-
isfy (RN) nor (K).
The so-called classical modal logics (see, e.g. [6]) do not validate the rule (RN), nor the axiom (K). Therefore, they resemble
much our logic. The only rule that is common to all classical modal logics is
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It is well known that the logic EM is equal to the logic E added by the rule (RM). If we add the axioms (T) and (4) to the logic
EM, we obtain the logic EMT4.
Now it is clear that we can embed EMT4 to our logic ILGC by setting A :¼NOA. This means that EMT4 may be consid-
ered as a ‘sublogic’ of ILGC, and each provable EMT4-formula can be viewed as a provable ILGC-formula.
Neighbourhood semantics is a generalization of Kripke semantics invented independently by Scott [40] and Montague
[31]. A neighbourhood model is a triple M ¼ ðU;N; vÞ, where U is a non-empty set, v is a valuation, and N : U ! }ð}ðUÞÞ is
a map associating for any point x 2 U a collection NðxÞ of subsets of U called the neighbourhood of x. Satisﬁability for A
is deﬁned byM; x  A iff fy 2 U jM; y  Ag 2 NðxÞ:
EMT4 is known (see, e.g. [6]) to be complete with respect to neighbourhood frames ðU;NÞ such that
(i) ð8x 2 UÞX#Y and X 2 NðxÞ imply Y 2 NðxÞ,
(ii) ð8x 2 UÞX 2 NðxÞ implies x 2 X,
(iii) ð8x 2 UÞX 2 NðxÞ implies fy 2 U j X 2 NðyÞg 2 NðxÞ.
Conditions (i)–(iii) correspond the axioms (M), (T), and (4), respectively.
Next we present an alternative semantics for EMT4motivated by the fact that each Galois connection between two power
sets determines a lattice-theoretical interior operator. Our approach resembles the topological interpretation of modal logic
initiated by Tarski (see, e.g. [1], where further references can be found), in which each propositional variable represents a
region of the topological space, and so does every formula. The connectives :, _ and ^ are interpreted as complement, union
and intersection, respectively. The modal connective  becomes the topological interior operator, and if we deﬁne the con-
nective  as the dual A :¼ ::A, then  is the corresponding topological closure operator. Topological models
M ¼ ðU;T; vÞ are topological spaces ðU;TÞ equipped with a valuation function v: P ! }ðUÞ.
Here we may proceed in an analogous manner. A map : }ðUÞ ! }ðUÞ is called a lattice-theoretical interior operator, if for
all X; Y#U,
(Int1) X#X,
(Int2) X#Y implies X#Y, and
(Int3) X ¼ X
For any familyI#}ðUÞ, the pair ðU;IÞ is called an interior system ifSS 2 I for allS#I, that is, I is closed under arbi-
trary unions of its elements.
Lattice-theoretical interior operators and systems are closely connected. Namely, if ðU;IÞ is an interior system, then the
map X#
SfY 2 I jY #Xg is a lattice-theoretical interior operator. Similarly, if X#X is a lattice theoretical interior operator,
thenI ¼ fX jX#Ug is closed under unions, and the pair ðU;IÞ is an interior system. This correspondence between interior
systems and lattice-theoretical interior operators is bijective. This is analogous to the correspondence between lattice-the-
oretical closure operators and closure systems; see [5], for example.
Each interior system ðU;IÞ may also be viewed as a complete lattice ðI; # Þ, where_
S ¼
[
S and
^
S ¼
\
S
 
for every S#I, where : }ðUÞ ! }ðUÞ is the interior operator corresponding ðU;IÞ. The least element of I is ; and the
greatest element of I is U. Note that possibly U–U, that is, U R I.
It is also well known that if : }ðUÞ ! }ðUÞ is a lattice-theoretical interior operator, then its dual : }ðUÞ ! }ðUÞ deﬁned
by X :¼ Xcc is a lattice-theoretical closure operator, that is, for all X;Y#U: (i) X#X, (ii) X#Y implies X#Y, and (iii)
X ¼ X. The dual notion of interior systems is closure systems, which are families of sets closed under intersections.
We introduce interior models to deﬁne semantics for EMT4-formulae. For an interior system ðU;IÞ, an interior model is a
tripleM ¼ ðU;I; vÞ, where v: P ! }ðUÞ is a valuation function. Validity of formulae can be deﬁned inductively as in Section 3,
except thatM; x  A iff ð9X 2 IÞ x 2 X and M; y  A for all y 2 X:Lemma 10. For any formula A, vðAÞ ¼ vðAÞ.
Proof. (# ) Suppose that x 2 vðAÞ. ThenM; x  A, which means that there exists X 2 I such that x 2 X andM; y  A for all
y 2 X. Thus, y 2 vðAÞ for all y 2 X, that is, X# vðAÞ. This implies x 2 X ¼ X# vðAÞ.
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x 2 vðAÞ. h
An EMT4-formula A is said to be true in an interior modelM ¼ ðU;I; vÞ, writtenM  A, if for all x 2 U,M; x  A. The for-
mula A is valid in an interior system ðU;IÞ if it is true in all interior models based on ðU;IÞ. Finally, A is valid if it is valid in all
interior systems.
Theorem 11 (Soundness theorem). Each provable EMT4-formula is valid.
Proof. We show that axioms (T) and (4) are valid, and that rule (RM) preserves validity. That (MP) preserves validity is
trivial.
(T) vðA! AÞ ¼ vðAÞc [ vðAÞ ¼ ðvðAÞÞc [ vðAÞ  vðAÞc [ vðAÞ ¼ U.
(4) vðA! AÞ ¼ vðAÞc [ vðAÞ ¼ ðvðAÞÞc [ ðvðAÞÞ ¼ ðvðAÞÞc [ vðAÞ ¼ U.
(RM) Assume that A! B is valid. Then vðAÞ# vðBÞ. This implies vðAÞ ¼ vðAÞ# vðBÞ ¼ vðBÞ. Thus, also A! B is
valid. h
Next we shall show the converse, that is, every valid EMT4-formula is provable. We ﬁrst recall some notions that will be
needed for the proof. A subset C of formulae is called inconsistent if there are formulae A1; . . . ;An 2 C such that
‘ :ðA1 ^    ^ AnÞ; otherwise C is consistent. Additionally, C is a maximal consistent set if C is consistent, and any set of for-
mulae properly containing C is inconsistent.
The next two lemmas present some well-known general properties of maximal consistent sets. These results can be found
in [4], for example.
Lemma 12. Let C be a maximal consistent set of formulae. Then for all formulae A and B:
(i) If A provable, then A 2 C.
(ii) A 2 C () :A R C.
(iii) C is closed under modus ponens, that is, if A and A! B are in C, then also B is in C.
(iv) A ^ B 2 C() A 2 C and B 2 C.
(v) A _ B 2 C() A 2 C or B 2 C.
Lemma 13 (Lindenbaum’s lemma). Let C be a consistent set of formulae. Then there exists a maximal consistent set of formulae
Cþ such that C#Cþ.
Next we construct the canonical interior system and the corresponding canonical model. For that, we denote by U the
family of all maximal consistent sets of formulae. In addition, for any formula A, we deﬁnebA ¼ fC 2 U jA 2 Cg:
The canonical interior system is a pair ðU;IÞ such thatI is a subfamily of }ðUÞ generated by the all unions of the basic setsfdA jA is a formulag:
It is easy to see that ðU;IÞ is really an interior system. Namely, ifS#I, then each set inS is a union of some basic sets.
This means that also
S
S must be a union of some basic sets. Hence,
S
S 2 I.
The canonical interior model is a tripleM ¼ ðU;I; vÞ, where
(i) ðU;I) is the canonical interior system.
(ii) v: P ! }ðUÞ is the canonical valuation deﬁned byvðpÞ ¼ fC 2 U jp 2 Cg:Note that vðpÞ ¼ bp for all variables p 2 P. It is clear that for any maximal consistent set x 2 U and formula A,
x 2 bA () A 2 x:Wemay now present the Truth Lemma for canonical interior models. The proof is similar to the one for the corresponding
result for canonical topological models presented in [1,2], for instance.Lemma 14 (Truth lemma). LetM ¼ ðU;I; vÞ be the canonical interior model. Then for any maximal consistent set x 2 U and
formula A,M; x  A iff A 2 x:
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(() Suppose A 2 x, that is, x 2dA. By deﬁnition,dA is a basic set and hencedA 2 I. Furthermore, axiom (T) impliesdA# bA. This means that there exists X ¼dA such that x 2 X 2 I and for all y 2 X, y 2 bA. Thus, for all y 2 X, A 2 y, and so by
the induction hypothesisM; y  A. Thus,M; x  A.
()) Assume that M; x  A. Then there exists X 2 I such that x 2 X and M; y  A for all y 2 X. Since X is a union of
some basic sets, we have that there is a basic setdB for some formula B such that x 2dB and for all y 2dB ð#XÞ,M; y  A,
that is, A 2 y and y 2 bA by the induction hypothesis. This means that dB# bA. But this implies that we can prove the
implication B! A; namely, if not, then there would be some maximal consistent set containing B and :A, and this would
givedB 6 # bA. By rule (RM), we can prove also the implication B! A. Therefore, by using axiom (4), we have B! A.
This implies x 2dB#dA, that is, A 2 x. h
Completeness is now obvious.
Theorem 15 (Completeness theorem). An EMT4-formula is valid if and only if it is provable.
Notice that we may also easily include the axiomðNÞ >
to our axiom system – we have to only assume that U 2 Imust hold, which means that ðU;IÞ is the so-called topped interior
system.
This modiﬁed logic is sound, because vð>Þ ¼ vð>Þ ¼ U ¼ U, that is, the axiom (N) is also valid. Furthermore, the
canonical interior system ðU;IÞ is now a topped interior system, because (N) implies > 2 C for all C 2 U andd> ¼ fC 2 U j> 2 Cg ¼ U;
which gives directly U 2 I.
Let us now conclude this section by returning to our starting point, that is, we consider again rough set approximation
operators. Let R be any binary relation on U and let the maps O: }ðUÞ ! }ðUÞ and N: }ðUÞ ! }ðUÞ be deﬁned as in Section
2. We may now deﬁne a mapping : }ðUÞ ! }ðUÞ by settingX :¼ XON ¼ fx 2 U j ð9y 2 UÞð8z 2 UÞx R y & ðz R y) z 2 XÞg:
Similarly, its dual : }ðUÞ ! }ðUÞ is deﬁned asX :¼ X4. ¼ fx 2 U j ð8y 2 UÞð9z 2 UÞx R y) ðz R y & z 2 XÞg:
If we put I ¼ fX jX#Ug, then the elements in I are such that X.4 ¼ X. Hence, each X 2 I may be interpreted in such a
way that X consists exactly of elements that are ‘possibly certainly’ in X. Note that if the relation R is serial, that is, for all
x 2 U, there exists y 2 U such that xRy, then U ¼ U. This means that U 2 I and hence ðU;IÞ becomes a topped interior sys-
tem, and the axiom (N) is valid. Note also that the assumption of seriality is quite natural – it means simply that each ele-
ment of the universe is ‘comparable’ at least with one element. Trivially, reﬂexivity implies seriality.
Moreover, if R is a preorder, then X ¼ XO and X ¼ X4 are topological interior and closure operators, and the family I
is a topology closed also under arbitrary intersections – that is, a so-called Alexandrov topology. The corresponding logic is S4.
6. Concluding remarks
In this paper, we introduced the logic ILGC. The logic has only two additional inference rules. Since we showed that ILGC is
equivalent to Kt , ILGC can be seen as a very simple formulation of Kt . However, ILGC is valuable as such, because it is an infor-
mation logic for generalized rough set operations. What is also interesting is that the additional inference rules (GC1) and
(GC2) do not involve negations. This means that we can easily append these rules to several non-classical logics, also. For
instance, in [18] we introduced a many-valued negationless logic of Galois connections suitable for rough L-sets.
We also showed how ILGC – and hence Kt – embeds in itself the non-normal modal logic EMT4. EMT4 is complete with
respect to the neighbourhood semantics. Here, we introduced an alternative semantics based on interior systems for EMT4.
Completeness of EMT4 with respect to interior semantics was proved. It is now clear that if A is a valid EMT4-formula with
respect to neighbourhood semantics, A must be valid also with respect to interior semantics, and vice versa.
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